Redefining Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Ohio by Miller, Michael S.
REDEFINING UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE IN OH1O
I. INTRODUCTION
Ohio has recently joined the increasing number of jurisdictions that require
insurance companies to offer some form of underinsured motorist coverage to their
insureds. "Underinsured motorist coverage" is a term of art referring to coverage
meant to protect an insured against negligent drivers who purchase insufficient liabil-
ity insurance. The term, however, because of differing perceptions of what con-
stitutes insufficient liability coverage, embraces many variations. Within the varying
perceptions of when a negligent driver should be deemed underinsured, two views
predominate; insufficient liability coverage can be triggered when the amount of the
negligent driver's liability insurance is less than the amount of damages the victim
has sustained, or, alternatively, when the former amount is less than the amount of
underinsured motorist coverage purchased by the victim.
This Comment will describe the goals of underinsured motorist coverage and
examine the extent to which each of the two types of underinsured motorist coverage
identified above meets these goals. It will then categorize the version of underinsured
-motorist coverage that exists in Ohio and assess the extent to which this particular
version achieves the ends that it was intended to serve.
II. RESPONSES TO THE NEED FOR UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
A. General Response
In the early 1900s the increasing use of the automobile for transportation began
to bring greater mobility to the American population. Unfortunately, however, this
engendered a concomitant rise in the number of personal injuries resulting from the
negligent operation of the automobile. It soon became apparent that persons who
were injured by and had subsequently obtained valid judgments against negligent
drivers were frequently unable to execute those judgments because the tortfeasor
"neither purchased [liability] insurance nor possessed sufficient personal financial
resources to enable [the tortfeasor] to respond to ... damage claims . . . .,
To remedy this inequity many states began to require drivers to obtain insurance.
Massachusetts, in 1927, became the first state to institute a mandatory insurance
program. 2 Of course, this did not aid plaintiffs injured by negligent drivers who had
1. A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE § 1.1 (1969).
2. See 1 I. SCHERSIER, AUTrOsOmLE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 1.01 (rev. ed. 1979). Although Massachusetts was
the first state to require liability coverage and remained for thirty years the only state to do so, Connecticut passed its
Financial Responsibility Act in 1925, which required the defendant to prove his or her ability to satisfy any claim up to at
least ten thousand dollars. If the motorist could not meet the financial responsibility requirement the State Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles could revoke the registration of and refuse to register any motor vehicle owned by the defendant.
Despite its drawbacks (it was not triggered until after the defendant had been involved in an accident, and it required the
injured party to initiate the action), this statute served as a model for statutes in twenty-seven states in the next decade. See
A. WIDISS, supra note 1, at § 1.3.
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nevertheless failed to purchase the required coverage. To remedy this problem, many
states recently began to require that insurers offer uninsured motorist coverage. This
coverage is designed to provide an alternate source of compensation to the injured
insured when the tortfeasor lacks liability coverage.3 Today, statutes in all fifty
states4 require that this coverage be provided or at least offered to insureds. 5
As commendable as uninsured motorist coverage is, however, it fails to deal
with the serious problem of underinsured drivers. 6 This problem arises when the
amount of the injured insured's damages exceeds the amount of liability insurance
coverage available from the tortfeasor,7 and occurs in two situations: first, when the
limit of the tortfeasor's liability coverage is less than the injured insured's damages
and, second, when the limits of the liability coverage would be enough to provide full
compensation but the injured insured is able to recover only a portion thereof because
of the presence of other claimants. 8 In both cases, although the tortfeasor possessed at
3. See generally A. WIDISS, supra note 1, at § 1.1-1.12.
4. Note, Orris v. Claudio: Validity of the Owned-But-Uninsured Vehicle Exclusion Under Uninsured Motorist
Coverage, 10 CAP. U.L. REv. 415, 415 (1980).
5. See A. WtDss, supra note 1, at § 8.3, where this distinction is labeled "'mandatory offering vs. mandatory
coverage." In both situations the insurer must offer the coverage, but in the former the insured can reject the coverage,
while in the latter he or she cannot.
6. It has been estimated that in Ohio there is only a one in ten chance of being involved in an accident with an
uninsured motorist, while there is a one in four chance of being involved in an accident with a motorist carrying at least the
minimum amount of liability insurance. See Note, Shelby Mutual Insurance Company v. Smith and Amended Senate Bill
No. 25: Re-evaluating Public Policy and Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Why "Underinsured" Protection is Necessary,
3 Ono N.U.L. REv. 1355, 1363 (1976) (citing Letter from John T. Dublin, Customer Relations Office of Nationwide
Insurance, to Marie E. Peck (February 18, 1976)). Clearly, as Professor Maldonado points out, "underinsurance is a real
problem .... Maldonado, Requiring Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Ohio, 6 OHio N.U.L. REv. 534, 536-37
(1979).
7. The Ohio Supreme Court has rejected the argument that an underinsured tortfeasor is "uninsured" to the extent
of his or her underinsurance (i.e., to the extent of the injured insured's uncompensated damages). Shelby Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Smith, 45 Ohio St. 2d 66, 341 N.E.2d 597 (1976). Many jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion. Some have
done so even when the actual amount recoverable from the tortfeasor is reduced below the statutory minimum or depleted
entirely due to the presence of multiple claimants. See, e.g., Chafin v. Aetna Ins. Co., 550 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1976)
(interpreting New Mexico law); Criterion Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 347 So. 2d 384 (Ala. 1977); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Austin, 143 Ga. App. 309, 238 S.E.2d 253 (1977); Ripley Resin Engineering Co., Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 388
N.E.2d 1258 (11. App. Ct. 1979); Richard v. Zurich Ins. Co., 318 So. 2d 83 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (implicitly overruled by
statutory amendment, see Whitten v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., -353 So. 2d 1071 (La. Ct. App. 1977)); Saari v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 72 Mich. App. 278, 249 N.W.2d 390 (1976); Gardner v. Am. Ins. Co., 95 Nev. 291, 593
P.2d 465 (1979); Allstate Ins. Co. v. O'Shaughnessy, 118 N.H. 66, 384 A.2d 486 (1978); Gorton v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
77 N.J. 563, 391 A.2d 1219 (1978); Tucker v. Peerless Ins. Co., Inc., 41 N.C. App. 302, 254 S.E.2d 656 (1979);
McKinley v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 1269 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980); Strunk v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 210, 580 P.2d 622 (1978). Some courts, however, have held an underinsured motorist
"uninsured" to the extent of his or her underinsurance. See, e.g., Williams v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 382 So.
2d 1216 (Fla. 1980).
8. As Professor Maldonado observed:
Underinsurance is a real problem which has left many injured motorists insufficiently compensated and which
has allowed many defendants to escape liability because they have complied with the minimum statutory
requirements....
[C]laims [for underinsured motorist coverage] have been asserted in two different situations. One
situation occurs where the insured's injuries exceed the total amount of indemnification provided by the
tortfeasor's liability insurance ....
Another situation occurs where an insured [is not fully compensated] ... because the tortfeasor's
insurance was distributed to several claimants thereby reducing the amount that individual claimants could
receive ....
Maldonado, Requiring Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Ohio, 6 OHio N.U.L. REv. 534, 536-37 (1979).
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least the statutory minimum amount of liability coverage, 9 that amount was in-
sufficient, either because the injured insured's injuries were severe, or because there
were multiple injured persons. Uninsured motorist coverage does not deal with either
situation, since the tortfeasor was underinsured, and not uninsured.
Underinsured motorist coverage is designed to provide an additional source of
compensation (unlike uninsured motorist coverage, which provides an alternate
source) when the tortfeasor possesses liability coverage but the amount thereof is not
sufficient to fully compensate the injured insured. As of early 1980, twenty-one states
had enacted statutes requiring some type of underinsured motorist coverage.' ° The
remaining states have left to the insurers' discretion the decision whether to offer such
coverage. "
The effectiveness of underinsured motorist coverage is a function of its defini-
tion. As noted above, existing statutes define an underinsured motorist in one of two
ways. Statutes focus on either the relative amounts of the tortfeasor's liability cover-
age and the injured insured's underinsured motorist coverage, or solely on the amount
of the injured insured's damages.1 2 Once underinsured motorist coverage is triggered
by the involvement of an underinsured motorist, the amount that the insured victim
may recover also varies according to the definition of underinsured motorist cover-
age. Statutes requiring that the amount of the injured insured's underinsured motorist
coverage exceed the amount of the tortfeasor's liability coverage before the former is
triggered restrict the injured insured's recovery to the extent of that excess. Statutes
that merely require the presence of uncompensated damages before the underinsured
motorist coverage is triggered allow the injured insured to seek compensation, up to
the stated policy limits of his or her underinsured motorist coverage, to the extent
necessary to provide full, or at least more complete, compensation.' 3
Thus, the degree to which underinsured motorist coverage meets its goal of
providing an additional source of compensation to insureds who are injured by un-
derinsured motorists is dependent upon its definition. The definition that focuses on
the relative amounts of the tortfeasor's liability coverage and the injured insured's
underinsured motorist coverage renders the availability of underinsured motorist
9. An Ohio appellate court held that if the limits of the tortfeasor's liability coverage are less than the statutory
minimum (OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4509.20 (Page 1982)) then the tortfeasor is "uninsured" since this constitutes a
denial of coverage. Wolverton v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 52 Ohio App. 2d 20, 367 N.E.2d 1197 (1976). See also State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hallowell, 426 A.2d 822 (Del. 1980); Oleson v. Farmers Ins. Group, 605 P.2d 166 (Mont. 1980).
10. 1 I. SCHtERMER, supra note 2, at § 35.02.
11. In Ohio, prior to the statutory requirement that insurers offer underinsured motorist coverage, eight of the
insurance companies responding to a survey indicated that they voluntarily offered underinsured motorist coverage. See
Note, Shelby Mutual Insurance Company v. Smith and Amended Senate Bill No. 25: Re-evaluating Public Policy and
Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Why "Underinsured" Protection is Necessary, 3 OHto N.U.L. REv. 1355, 1363 n.40
(1976).
12. "There are two types of statutory definitions of underinsured motorists-those that focus on the policy limits of
the tortfeasor and those ... that focus on the extent of the damages suffered by the insured victim." Comment,
Washington's Underinsured Motorist Statute: Balancing the Interests of Insurers and Insureds, 55 WASH. L. REv. 819,
821 (1980) (footnotes omitted). For a further breakdown of underinsured motorist statutes see 1I. SCHERMtR, supra note
2, at § 35.02.
13. See I I. SCHEiME, supra note 2, at § 35.04.
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coverage dependent on the fortuitous relationship between those amounts, thereby
ignoring the plaintiffs uncompensated damages, as a few examples can illustrate.
Example 1. Facts: The injured insured sustains one hundred thousand dollars in
damages, and possesses fifty thousand dollars in underinsured motorist coverage.
The tortfeasor has fifty thousand dollars in liability coverage. Result: The injured
insured's underinsured motorist coverage is not available; the tortfeasor is not an
underinsured motorist as defined by the statute since the amount of underinsured
motorist coverage does not exceed the amount of the tortfeasor's liability coverage. 14
Example 2. Facts: The injured insured has one hundred thousand dollars in
damages and fifty thousand dollars in underinsured motorist coverage. The tortfeasor
has fifty thousand dollars in liability coverage. Additionally, suppose that another
person injured in the same accident is entitled to a portion of the tortfeasor's liability
coverage, thus preventing the injured insured from recovering the full amount of the
tortfeasor's liability coverage. Result: The injured insured's underinsured motorist
coverage is not available; because the amount thereof does not exceed the amount of
the tortfeasor's liability coverage, the tortfeasor is not an underinsured motorist as
defined by the statute. 15
In each of the above examples the injured insured was unable to draw upon his
or her underinsured motorist coverage despite the existence of uncompensated dam-
ages. In those jurisdictions that require only uncompensated damages to trigger
underinsured motorist coverage, however, the injured insured in each example would
have been able to collect the full fifty thousand dollars since he or she had un-
compensated damages in at least that amount. 16
Even after the injured insured's underinsured motorist coverage is triggered, the
amount that he or she may recover still depends on the statutory definition that is
applied. The definition that focuses upon the fortuitous relationship between the
amounts of the tortfeasor's liability coverage and the injured insured's underinsured
motorist coverage requires that the injured insured's recovery always be reduced by
any amount received from the tortfeasor.
14. See, e.g., Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Fla. 1978); Fontenot v. Guillory, 327
So. 2d 578,583 n.3 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Lick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977) (implicitly overruled
by statutory amendment, see Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244, 250 (Minn. 1980)); Muller v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 627 S.W.2d 775 (rex. Ct. App. 1981). These cases refused to find underinsured motorist coverage applicable, since
the injured insured's underinsured motorist coverage limit did not exceed the limit of the tortfeasor's liability coverage.
15. See, e.g., Thiry v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1978) (implicitly overruled by statutory
amendment, see Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244, 250 (Minn. 1980)); Rogers v. Tennessee Mut. Ins.
Co., 620 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1981). In both cases, because the injured insured's underinsured coverage did not exceed the
amount of the tortfeasor's liability coverage, the injured insured was precluded from seeking compensation through his or
her underinsured coverage, despite his or her recovery of only a small portion of that liability coverage because of the
presence of multiple claims. But see American Gen. Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Oestreich, 617 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981). Even though the policy amount of the injured insured's uninsured motorist coverage did not exceed the policy
amount of the tortfeasor's liability coverage, this case allowed the injured insured to seek recovery, since the injured
insured was unable to draw upon the full policy amount of the tortfeasor's liability coverage because of the presence of
multiple claims. Of course, the court allowed recovery only to the extent of the difference between the injured insured's
coverage and the amount recovered from the tortfeasor.
16. See, e.g., Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1980); Whitten v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 353 So. 2d 1071 (La. Ct. App. 1977). In each of these cases the existence of uncompensated damages was sufficient
to trigger the injured insured's underinsured motorist coverage.
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Example 3. Facts: The injured insured sustained one hundred thousand dollars
in damages and possesses fifty thousand dollars in underinsured motorist coverage.
The tortfeasor has forty-five thousand dollars in liability coverage. Result: The in-
jured insured may draw upon his or her underinsured motorist coverage since the
amount thereof exceeds the amount of the tortfeasor's liability coverage and the
tortfeasor is thus an underinsured motorist as defined in the statute. The injured
insured, however, may recover only to the extent of that excess (i.e., five thousand
dollars) since, according to the above definition, that is the extent to which the
tortfeasor was underinsured.17
Example 4. Facts: The injured insured has one hundred thousand dollars dam-
ages and fifty thousand dollars in underinsured motorist coverage. The tortfeasor has
forty-five thousand dollars in liability coverage. Additionally, another person injured
in the same accident is entitled to ten thousand dollars of the tortfeasor's liability
coverage. Result: The injured insured may draw upon his or her underinsured motor-
ist coverage since the amount thereof exceeds the amount of the tortfeasor's liability
coverage and the tortfeasor is thus underinsured as defined in the statute. In some
jurisdictions the injured insured may only recover the excess (i.e., five thousand
dollars) since, according to the above definition, that is the degree to which the
tortfeasor was underinsured. In other jurisdictions, however, the injured insured may
recover fifteen thousand dollars - the difference between the fifty thousand dollars
in underinsured motorist coverage and the thirty-five thousand dollars recovered from
the tortfeasor.' 8
In each of the last two examples, the injured insured was able to draw upon only
a part of his or her underinsured coverage despite the existence of additional un-
compensated damages. Again, however, in both examples, if the jurisdiction re-
quired only uncompensated damages to trigger underinsured motorist coverage, the
injured insured would have been able to recover the entire fifty thousand dollars since
he or she would have had uncompensated damages in at least that amount. 19
17. See, e.g., Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Fla. 1978); Fontenot v. Guillory, 327
So. 2d 578,583 n.3 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Lick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977) (implicitly overruled
by statutory amendment, see Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244, 250 (Minn. 1980)); Muller v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 627 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981). These cases held that once underinsured motorist coverage is triggered the
injured insured's recovery is limited to the difference between the amount thereof and the amount of the tortfeasor's
liability coverage.
18. Although no eases with this specific fact pattern were found, courts would presumably reach this conclusion
under most statutes that adopt the definition of an underinsured motorist focusing on the fortuitous relation between the
amounts of the injured insured's underinsured motorist coverage and the tortfeasor's liability coverage, because the
comparison is of the policy amounts whereas the set-off required is of any amounts actually recovered. The Illinois statute,
for example, states that an "'underinsured motor vehicle' means a motor vehicle ... for which the sum of the limits of
liability... is less than the limits for underinsured motorist coverage" but then provides that "the limits of liability for
an insurer providing underinsured coverage shall be the limits of such coverage, less those amounts actually recovered
[rather than the limits of the tortfeasor's liability coverage] under the applicable ... insurance policies." ILt. REV. STAT.
ch. 175, § 143a-2(3) (Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). For similar statutory language see Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.39-320 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981) and TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Vernon 1982-83). The revised version of the
Ohio statutory provision for underinsured motorist coverage also mandates a comparison of policy limits, but provides a
set-off equal to the amount actually recovered from the tortfeasor rather than the amount of the policy limit. OHio REv.
CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page Supp. 1982).
19. See, e.g., Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1980); Whitten v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 353 So. 2d 1071 (La. Ct. App. 1977). In these cases the injured insureds were able to collect the full amount of their
underinsured motorist coverage without allowing the insurer to deduct the amounts actually recovered from the tortfeasor.
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Of course, neither definition guarantees total compensation under all circum-
stances. Had the injured insured's damages exceeded one hundred thousand dollars,
complete compensation would not have been achieved in any of the four examples.
The different definitions, however, would have resulted in different amounts of
uncompensated damages, with the definition that requires only the existence of un-
compensated damages always providing a greater degree of compensation. 20
Clearly, those statutes that require the mere presence of uncompensated dam-
ages more nearly attain the goal of full compensation for the innocent victims of
negligent drivers. Under these statutes the injured insured will always be able to draw
upon the full amount of his or her underinsured motorist coverage to the extent that
his or her damages exceed the amount recovered from the tortfeasor. In contrast, the
injured insured's ability to draw upon his or her underinsured motorist coverage to
cover his or her uncompensated damages under those statutes that focus on the
relation between the tortfeasor's liability coverage and the injured insured's un-
derinsured motorist coverage depends upon the fortuitous relationship between those
amounts. Thus, it would not be enough merely to have damages in excess of the
amount recovered from the tortfeasor, even though the goal of underinsured motorist
coverage is to provide compensation in such situations; the injured insured must also
have an amount of underinsured motorist coverage that exceeds the amount of the
tortfeasor's liability coverage.
B. Ohio's Response
The Ohio General Assembly responded to the need for protection against negli-
gent drivers with insufficient liability coverage by mandating that underinsured
motorist coverage be offered by insurance companies as optional coverage, beginning
June 25, 1980.21 Because this statute was so recent, the courts had little opportunity
to interpret its exact meaning.2 2 Nonetheless, the Ohio General Assembly, apparently
dissatisfied with the original version of the underinsured motorist statute,' has
already repealed it. The statute's provisions were amended2 4 and incorporated into
Ohio's uninsured motorist statute.2 5
20. In Muller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 627 SAV.2d 775 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981), the insured had damages in excess of two
hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars with ten thousand dollars in underinsured coverage. The tortfeasor had ten
thousand dollars in liability coverage, which was recovered by the injured insured. The court held that the insured could
not collect the underinsured coverage because the tortfeasor was not "underinsured." However, even in ajurisdiction that
would have allowed recovery of the ten thousand dollars in underinsured coverage, the total compensation would have
amounted to only twenty thousand dollars, which is less than ten percent of the injured insured's actual damages (although
double the amount actually recovered).
21. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.181 (Page Supp. 1981). This statute provides, in part, that -[e]ach automobile
liability ... insurance company ... shall offer underinsured motorist coverage as optional protection ..... Id. at
§ 3937.181(B).
22. This problem is encountered with nearly all of the underinsured motorist statutes now in effect, because of the
unavoidable delay between the enactment of a statute and its interpretation by the judiciary.
23. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.181 (Page Supp. 1981).
24. See Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page Supp. 1982). The Ohio General Assembly repealed Onto REV.
CODE ANN. § 3937.181 (Page Supp. 198 1) and amended Ono REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A) (Page Supp. 1982) to state
that "[n]o ... policy of insurance ... shall be delivered ... unless ... the following [is] ... provided: ... Under-
insured motorist coverage .... The named insured may only reject or accept [this] ... coverage ...." Thus, the
action of the Ohio General Assembly did not change the requirement that underinsured motorist coverage still be offered
as optional coverage. Hence, the insured can still reject the coverage even though it must be offered.
25. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page Supp. 1982).
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This Comment will examine the changes thus made in underinsured motorist
coverage in light of the goals of such coverage and will assess the degree to which the
revised Ohio statute meets these goals. It will be argued that because the revised
statute focuses upon the fortuitous relation between the amounts of the injured in-
sured's underinsured motorist coverage and the tortfeasor's liability coverage, it does
not effectively attain the goals of underinsured motorist coverage. 26 Two other prob-
lems will then be identified and discussed. First, the statute precludes insureds who
choose to purchase the minimum amount of liability coverage2 7 from obtaining
effective underinsured motorist coverage. 28 Second, Ohio's approach mandates in-
herently deceptive insurance contracts since the amount of underinsured motorist
coverage purchased will always be at least twelve thousand five hundred dollars
2 9
less than the amount stated in the policy.
IL. OHIO LAW
A. The History of Ohio's Original Underinsured Motorist Statute
Ohio's recently repealed underinsured motorist statute, as originally enacted in
1980, provided that "underinsured motorist coverage means coverage ... protec-
ting an insured against loss ... where the limits of coverage available for payment
to the insured ... are insufficient to pay the loss up to the insured's uninsured
[which the underinsured limits must be equal to] motorist coverage limits."30 This
language does not make clear which of the two competing definitions of underinsured
motorist coverage the Ohio General Assembly intended to adopt. If attention is
focused on the words "insufficient to pay the loss, ' '31 it seems to imply a definition
that requires only uncompensated damages. However, that phrase is followed by the
words "up to the insured's uninsured motorist coverage limits," 32 which may indi-
cate an intent to adopt the definition that focuses on the fortuitous relation between
the amount of the tortfeasor's liability coverage and the amount of the injured in-
sured's underinsured motorist coverage. This reading, by limiting total recovery to
the amount of the injured insured's underinsured motorist coverage, would require
that any amounts actually recovered from the tortfeasor be deducted from the amount
that the injured insured could recover from his or her underinsured motorist coverage.
In that way the total amount of the injured insured's recovery will not exceed the total
amount of underinsured motorist coverage he or she has purchased. Of course, that
language can be viewed merely as a simple assertion that underinsured motorist
coverage does not guarantee full compensation 33 and that the injured insured may not
recover through underinsured motorist coverage in excess of its limits even though he
26. See infra text accompanying notes 76-90.
27. Omo Ray. CODE ANN. § 4509.20 (Page 1982). Under this statute an insurance policy must provide liability
coverage of at least twelve thousand five hundred dollars per person, and twenty-five thousand dollars per occurrence.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 91-100.
29. This is the minimum statutory amount of liability coverage available in Ohio. Ofno REv. CODE ANN. § 4509.20
(Page 1982). See also infra text accompanying notes 98-100.
30. Omo R-v. CODE ANN. § 3937.181 (Page Supp. 1981).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See supra note 20.
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or she may have additional uncompensated damages. This ambiguity therefore rend-
ers the definition capable of supporting various conclusions. 34
B. Judicial Interpretations of the Original Statute
The original version of the Ohio underinsured motorist statute has been in-
terpreted by two cases: Shaneck v. Buckeye Union Insurance Co. 35 and Buckeye
Union Insurance Co. v. Wallace.3 6 Because of the ambiguity inherent in the statutory
definition, these two cases reached opposite conclusions even though they were
decided less than one month apart and in the same county. Moreover, although
Shaneck was decided by the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County, Ohio, on
February 27, 1981, and Wallace was decided by the Court of Appeals of Lucas
County on March 27, 1981, the later opinion made no mention of the earlier one.
1. Shaneck v. Buckeye Union Insurance Co.
In Shaneck the injured insured possessed underinsured motorist coverage in the
amount of twenty-five thousand dollars per person and fifty thousand dollars per
occurrence. 37 The negligent driver possessed liability insurance with limits of fifteen
thousand dollars per person and thirty thousand dollars per occurrence. 38 The injured
insured exhausted the tortfeasor's liability coverage through a settlement for the
entire fifteen thousand dollars. 39 The court stated:
This action presents ... [the] issue ... whether plaintiff [injured insured] is entitled to
$25,000 in coverage based on the underinsured endorsement on defendant's [insurer's]
policy. Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to the entire $25,000 coverage subject to his
proving damages up to that amount. Defendant contends that its liability must be reduced
by the $15,000 which plaintiff has recovered [from the negligent driver]. 40
Because the injured insured's underinsured motorist coverage exceeded the tort-
feasor's liability coverage, the question whether the tortfeasor was an underinsured
motorist never arose. The sole issue was the extent of the tortfeasor's underinsurance.
34. Schermer classified this version of the Ohio underinsured motorist statute as one "which requirels] ... only
that the insured's damages exceed the tortfeasor's liability limits." 11. SCHERMER, supra note 2, at § 35.0212]. The Ohio
Department of Insurance, however, reached the opposite conclusion:
"Underinsured motorist coverage" means coverage in [a] ... policy... where the limits of coverage
available . . . under all . . . insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured are insufficient to pay the
loss up to the insured's uninsured motorist coverage limits. This coverage is the difference of the insured's own
limit of underinsured coverage and the limits available from ... any persons liable to the insured.
OIO ADMIN. CoDE § 3901-1-39 (1981) (emphasis added).
Although Schermer did not explicitly state that the Ohio statute would allow the injured insured to seek recovery of
the full amount of his or her underinsured motorist coverage, this conclusion necessarily follows from his classification of
the Ohio statute as one which requires only uncompensated damages to trigger underinsured motorist coverage. Similarly,
although the Department of Insurance did not explicitly state that underinsured motorist coverage is triggered only when it
exceeds the amount of the tortfeasor's liability coverage, this conclusion necessarily follows from their finding that an
injured insured may recover under underinsured motorist coverage only to the extent of the excess.
35. 20 Ohio Op. 3d 115 (C.P. Lucas County 1981).
36. No. 80-146 (Ohio Ct. App. March 27, 1981).
37. 20 Ohio Op. 3d 115, 116 (C.P. Lucas County 1981).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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In deciding this issue the court first pointed out that, strictly speaking, the
underinsured motorist statute4' was not controlling, since it became effective on
September 1, 1980, and the accident occurred almost two years earlier, on September
7, 1978.42 The court then noted the absence of any Ohio cases dealing with un-
derinsured motorist coverage.4 3 The court, however, reasoned that the interpretation
of underinsured motorist coverage should be carried out in light of the cases involving
uninsured coverage, 44 since the underinsured motorist statute explicitly provided that
"[t]he benefits provided under underinsured motorist coverage shall be subject to the
same provisions as to denial of coverage, insolvency, subrogation, or off-set as
- 45provided in uninsured motorist coverage ....
The court thus identified the policy behind underinsured motorist coverage by
relying on the uninsured motorist coverage cases: "Ohio courts dealing with un-
insured motorist protection have consistently applied a liberal construction of R.C.
§ 3937.18 in order to effectuate the legislative purpose that coverage be provided to
persons injured through the acts of uninsured [and underinsured] motorists . '...,,46
Basing its opinion upon this goal of underinsured motorist coverage, the court con-
cluded that the injured insured could recover under his underinsured motorist cover-
age the entire twenty-five thousand dollars because this would result in more com-
plete compensation.
4 7
Thus, Shaneck focused solely on the existence of uncompensated damages and
did not allow the insurer to reduce its liability by the amount recovered from the
tortfeasor. This more effectively promotes the goal of underinsured motorist cover-
age, which is the provision of an additional source of compensation to persons injured
by negligent drivers. Of course, the court did not allow recovery in excess of the
damages sustained. The injured insured must still show damages, to "avoid any
duplication or excess recovery of benefits."
48
2. Buckeye Union Insurance Co. v. Wallace
In Wallace the injured insured possessed underinsured motorist coverage in the
amount of fifteen thousand dollars per person and thirty thousand dollars per
occurrence. 49 The tortfeasor possessed liability insurance with limits of fifteen
thousand dollars per person and thirty thousand dollars per occurrence.50 The court
was thus forced to determine whether the injured insured's underinsured motorist
coverage was triggered, or, in other words, whether the tortfeasor was an un-
derinsured motorist, and, if so, the amount of underinsured motorist coverage that
41. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.181 (Page Supp. 1981).
42. 20 Ohio Op. 3d 115, 116 (C.P. Lucas County 1981).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.181(C) (Page Supp. 1981).
46. 20 Ohio Op. 3d 115, 117 (C.P. Lucas County 1981) (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 119.
48. Id.
49. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Wallace, No. 80-146, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. March 27, 1981).
50. Id.
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was available to the injured insured. Depending on which definition the court
adopted, the injured insured would either have an additional fund of fifteen thousand
dollars (the entire stated policy amount of underinsured motorist coverage) to provide
added compensation for his injuries, or nothing (the difference between his un-
derinsured motorist coverage and the tortfeasor's liability coverage). The former
would result under the definition which focuses simply on the existence of un-
compensated damages, whereas the latter would result under the definition that fo-
cuses on the fortuitous relation between the amount of the injured insured's un-
derinsured motorist coverage and the amount of the tortfeasor's liability coverage.
The Court in Wallace found that the tortfeasor was not an underinsured motorist:
"[T]he appellant [injured insured] may not recover under the policy for the tort-
feasor's underinsurance, because, although the tortfeasor may be underinsured in
relation to the appellant's damages, he is not underinsured for the purpose of the
statute and policy endorsement." 5 1
This conclusion, however, was based upon a nonexistent statute. The court
believed that the language of the underinsured motorist endorsement in the insurance
policy was identical to the language of the statute:
The clause in question is the definition of underinsured highway vehicle as defined in
R.C. 3937.18.1 and quoted verbatim in the appellant's automobile endorsement No.
4919. The clause states: "Underinsured highway vehicle means a highway vehicle with
respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which the sum of the limits of liability
under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the
accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under this insurance .... '52
This language defines an underinsured motorist as one who has liability insurance in
an amount less than the injured insured's liability insurance (which, in Wallace, was
an amount equal to the injured insured's underinsured motorist coverage). Although
the above quoted language may have been included in the insurance policy before the
court, it was not identical to the language of the underinsured motorist statute in force
at the time of the decision. 53 This discrepancy severely weakens the validity of the
Wallace holding because the court explicitly based its holding on the language of
what it believed was the Ohio underinsured motorist statute.
The conflicting conclusions of these two cases left Ohio law unsettled with
respect to the correct definition of an underinsured motorist. Had the Ohio General
Assembly remained silent, it is likely that the Shaneck holding would have ultimately
prevailed. Several considerations lead to this conclusion. First, the decisions of the
Ohio Supreme Court regarding uninsured motorist coverage evince a strong desire to
protect the innocent victims of negligent drivers and to ensure that they will be
compensated adequately.5 4 This attitude presumably would have carried over into the
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
53. That language, however, is very similar to the recently revised provisions for underinsured motorist coverage.
OHo Rev. CODO ANN. § 3937.18 (Page Supp. 1982).
54. See, e.g., Ady v. West American Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 593, 433 N.E.2d 547 (1982) (overruling Orris v.
Claudio, 63 Ohio St. 2d 140,406 N.E.2d 1381 (1980)) (insurer may not avoid liability under uninsured motorist coverage
through "other owned but uninsured vehicle" exclusion); Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 431,
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underinsured motorist coverage cases. Second, as noted earlier, Wallace was based
upon a nonexistent statute. Last, Shaneck purported to interpret legislative intent,5 5
and the Ohio Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that "[p]rivate parties are without
power to insert enforceable provisions in their contracts of insurance which would
restrict coverage in a manner contrary to the intent of the statute." 5 6 The General
Assembly, however, did not remain silent.
C. The Recent Action of the Ohio General Assembly
1. Redefining "Underinsured Motorist"
Ohio's underinsured motorist statute57 was repealed and underinsured motorist
coverage was incorporated into the uninsured motorist statute,58 effective with regard
to policies issued or renewed on or after October 1, 1982. 59 The revised statute
provides, in relevant part, that:
Underinsured motorist coverage... shall provide protection for an insured against loss
... where the limits of coverage available for payment to the insured under all... in-
surance policies covering persons liable to the insured are less than the limits for the
insured's uninsured motorist coverage [which must be equal to the limits of the insured's
underinsured motorist coverage] at the time of the accident.60
This definition of underinsured motorist coverage, unlike its predecessor, does not
focus on the scenario arising when the "insurance policies covering persons liable to
the insured are insufficient to pay the lOSS. ' ' 6 1 Instead it focuses on the relation
between the amount of the tortfeasor's coverage and the amount of the injured
insured's underinsured motorist coverage. Therefore, the injured insured's un-
derinsured motorist coverage is triggered only when the amount thereof exceeds the
amount of the tortfeasor's liability coverage; uncompensated damages alone will not
suffice.
Assuming that Shaneck, for the reasons detailed above, would have prevailed
over Wallace absent action by the General Assembly, Ohio has changed from a
433 N.E.2d 555 (1982) (father, as "insured," is entitled to recover from uninsured motorist coverage expenses he was
legally obligated to pay for child who was not an "insured" under the policy); Grange Mut. Casualty Co. v. Volkmann,
54 Ohio St. 2d 58, 374 N.E.2d 1258 (1978) (insurer may not avoid liability under uninsured motorist coverage through
"other owned but uninsured vehicle" exclusion); Shearer v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 53 Ohio St. 2d 1, 371 N.E.2d 210
(1978) (amount recoverable under uninsured motorist coverage cannot be reduced by amounts recovered under medical
payments provision of another policy); Bartlett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Ohio St. 2d 50, 294 N.E.2d 665 (1973)
(amount recoverable under uninsured motorist coverage cannot be reduced by amounts received from workmen's com-
pensation); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tomanski, 27 Ohio St. 2d 222, 271 N.E.2d 924 (1971) (right to recover under
uninsured motorist coverage not destroyed by presence of insured vehicle in multi-vehicle accident); Curran v. State Auto
Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Ohio St. 2d 33, 266 N.E.2d 566 (1971) ("other insurance" clause, which would relieve insurer of
liability if other uninsured motorist coverage was available to insured, void as contrary to public policy); Abate v. Pioneer
Mut. Casualty Co., 22 Ohio St. 2d 161, 258 N.E.2d 429 (1970) (policy of insurance includes uninsured coverage unless
such coverage has been expressly rejected by the insured).
55. 20 Ohio Op. 3d 115, 118-19 (C.P. Lucas County 1981).
56. Bartlett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Ohio St. 2d 50, 53, 294 N.E.2d 665, 667 (1973).
57. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page Supp. 1982).
58. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.181 (Page Supp. 1981).
59. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page Supp. 1982).
60. Id. at § 3937.18(A)(2).
61. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.181 (Page Supp. 1981).
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jurisdiction that would have required only uncompensated damages to one that re-
quires the injured insured's underinsured motorist coverage to exceed the tortfeasor's
liability coverage. It is interesting to note that in at least two other jurisdictions,
Louisiana and Minnesota, the change was in the opposite direction.
In 1972 the Louisiana uninsured motorist statute was amended to "include a
vehicle with liability coverage less than the UM [uninsured motorist] coverage car-
ried by the insured, thus allowing the insured to recover the difference between the
underinsured tortfeasor's liability limits and his own injuries up to his UM limits." 62
In 1974, however, the Louisiana statute63 was again amended 64 to define un-
derinsured motorist in terms of uncompensated damages rather than in terms of the
relative amounts of the tortfeasor's liability coverage and the insured's underinsured
coverage. A Louisiana Court of Appeals observed:
The only logical conclusion to draw from the language of the 1974 amendment,
redefining "uninsured motor vehicle" as one on which the liability insurance coverage
was less than the damages sustained by the innocent party, is that it was designed
to ... permit full recovery of damages in appropriate cases .... In substance ... [the
innocent party's] UM [underinsured motorist] coverage because [sic] "excess" after his
settlement with the tortfeasor's liability carrier .... [If the insurer's] stated posi-
tion ... is carried to its logical conclusion, i.e., that the UM carrier is entitled to credit
for settlement proceeds received by the plaintiff, the UM coverage never becomes "ex-
cess". In effect, therefore, the 1974 amendment [would] become meaningless .... 65
Louisiana, therefore, enlarged rather than restricted the class of tortfeasors who can
be deemed underinsured.66
Similarly, although in Lick v. Dairyland Insurance Co. ,67 the Minnesota Su-
preme Court held that under the underinsured statute68 a tortfeasor is underinsured
only to the extent that his or her liability coverage is less than the underinsured
motorist coverage possessed by the injured insured,69 the statute was amended in
197770 and all the language upon which Lick relied was removed. 7 1 On this basis, the
Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently concluded that recoveries through un-
derinsured motorist policies are "in addition to bodily injury liability benefits [recov-
ered from the tortfeasor] to the extent of [the insured's] damages." 72 Under this
definition only uncompensated damages are needed to trigger underinsured motorist
coverage and the insurer may not reduce the injured insured's recovery by any
amounts received from the tortfeasor. Thus, Minnesota, like Louisiana, moved from
62. Uninsured Motorist Protection, 35 LA. L. REv. 616, 617 (1975) (citing LA. R. S. 22: 1406(D)(2) (Supp. 1962),
amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 137 § 1 (as it appeared before Act 154 of 1974)).
63. LA. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 1406 (West Supp. 1962) (amended by 1972 La. Acts 137).
64. 1974 La. Acts 154.
65. Whitten v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 353 So. 2d 1071, 1075 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
66. "The change in the definition of 'uninsured motor vehicle' is important because all the insured must now
establish is that the damages he has suffered are greater than the liability limits of the tortfeasor." Uninsured Motorist
Protection, 35 LA. L. REv. 616, 618 (1975) (emphasis in original).
67. 258 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977).
68. MINN. STAT. § 65B.26 (1971).
69. Lick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Minn. 1977).
70. 1977 Minn. Laws. 266.
71. See Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1980).
72. Id. at 251.
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a definition that focused on the fortuitous relation between the amounts of the injured
insured's underinsured motorist coverage and the tortfeasor's liability coverage, to
one that focuses solely on the existence of uncompensated damages.
Ohio, however, is being legislatively propelled in the opposite direction,
restricting or refusing to expand sources of compensation rather than providing addi-
tional sources of compensation to the innocent victims of another's wrongdoing. By
redefining the term "underinsured motorist" to make uncompensated damages in-
sufficient to trigger underinsured motorist coverage, Ohio's legislature has made the
availability of coverage entirely dependent upon the fortuitous relationship between
the amounts of the tortfeasor's liability coverage and the injured insured's un-
derinsured coverage, regardless of the amount of underinsured motorist coverage
purchased (in absolute terms) and the amount of damages sustained.7"
2. Reducing the Amount of Recovery When Underinsured
Motorist Coverage is Fortuitously Triggered
Ohio's underinsured motorist statute, as revised in 1982 by the Ohio General
Assembly and incorporated into Ohio's uninsured motorist statute, in addition to
redefining the term "uninsured motorist," provides that "[t]he limits of liability for
an insurer providing underinsured motorist coverage shall be the limits of such
coverage, less those amounts actually recovered under all applicable. . . insurance
policies covering persons liable to the insured."-7 4 This legislative action not only
changes7 5 the definition of an underinsured motorist in Ohio so that the statute
explicitly states that a tortfeasor is underinsured only if his or her liability coverage is
less than the injured insured's underinsured coverage, but also provides that un-
derinsured motorist coverage is available only to the extent of the difference between
those amounts. Thus, not only will underinsured motorist coverage be triggered in a
haphazard and unpredictable manner, but even after it is triggered, the amount that an
injured insured may recover will be diminished by any amounts recovered from the
tortfeasor. This result, of course, is the natural by-product of the definition adopted
by the General Assembly in the revised statute.
3. Assessing the Effectiveness of Underinsured
Motorist Coverage in Ohio
The definition of underinsured motorist coverage recently adopted by the Ohio
General Assembly does not effectively meet the goal of providing an additional
source of compensation to the innocent victims of negligent drivers. As noted above,
73. Even if the injured insured had purchased two hundred thousand dollars worth of underinsured motorist cover-
age, he or she could not be assured that its protection would be available when it was needed. Assuming that the injured
insured sustained four hundred thousand dollars in damages, the claimant would still be unable to seek compensation
through the underinsured motorist coverage if the tortfeasor possessed liability insurance in an equal or greater amount.
Thus, no amount of underinsured motorist coverage can absolutely be counted on to be available when needed.
74. Omno Rnv. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1982).
75. The Ohio General Assembly, however, stated that the purpose of its 1982 action was to "clarify," not
"change," the Ohio definition of an "underinsured motorist." This is evidenced by the title of the act, which stated that
its purpose was "to clarify the definition of underinsured motorist coverage." OHIo RE,. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page
Supp. 1982).
1983]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
whether the injured insured will be able to draw on his or her underinsured motorist
coverage is entirely dependent upon the relative amounts of the tortfeasor's liability
coverage and the insured's underinsured motorist coverage, regardless of the exis-
tence of uncompensated damages.
The ineffectiveness of underinsured motorist coverage defined in this manner is
most vividly demonstrated in those cases in which the injured insured is unable to
draw upon his or her underinsured motorist coverage even though nothing was recov-
ered from the tortfeasor.76 This results when the tortfeasor is not underinsured, since
the limits of his or her liability coverage are not less than the injured insured's
underinsured motorist coverage, but the injured insured is unable to recover through
the tortfeasor's liability coverage because it has been depleted by other injured per-
sons. Thus, the tortfeasor is not underinsured according to the statutory definition
even though the injured insured has not recovered anything. This can happen in Ohio,
since underinsured motorist coverage is triggered when "the limits of [liability]
coverage available for payment to the insured under all . . . insurance policies cover-
ing persons liable to the insured are less than the limits for the insured's uninsured
motorist coverage at the time of the accident. "77 This mandates a comparison of the
injured insured's underinsured motorist limits with the limits of the tortfeasor's liabil-
ity coverage, and not with the amount actually recovered from the tortfeasor. In other
words, the liability coverage need only be "available" and not "actually
recovered." 7
8
On the other hand, it would be possible for an Ohio court to construe this
language to mean that the injured insured's underinsured coverage limits should be
compared to the actual amounts recovered, rather than the amounts theoretically
available, on the ground that these are the only amounts actually "available" to the
insured. 79 This conclusion has been reached in at least two other jurisdictions,
Louisiana and Florida.
Louisiana courts have held that "[t]he [underinsured] statute should be con-
strued to mean the effective [amount of] liability coverage.''80 Thus the injured
insured is able to recover under his or her underinsured motorist coverage even
though the stated policy limits were lower than the policy limits of the tortfeasor's
liability coverage. Because of "the multiple claims filed . . . and the court's
apportionment of the policy proceeds, the effective liability coverage [but not the
stated policy limits] was less than the uninsured motorist coverage [which, in
Louisiana, is also underinsured coverage] carried by the plaintiff." 8 1 The court thus
mandated a comparison to the amount actually recovered from the tortfeasor. In
Louisiana, therefore, the amount of the injured insured's underinsured motorist
76. See supra note 15.
77. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
78. This position finds support in the appearance of the words "actually recovered" later in the statute to require a
reduction in the injured insured's underinsured motorist recovery by any amounts "actually recovered" from the tort-
feasor. Id.
79. See generally I I. SCHERMER, supra note 2, at § 35.06.
80. Butler v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 1129, 1133 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (emphasis in original).
81. Id.
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coverage need only exceed the amount actually recovered from the tortfeasor, rather
than the amount theoretically available under the policy. The court found this result to
be "in keeping with the intent and purpose of the uninsured motorist statute.' '82 Of
course, the injured insured may still recover only the difference between the amount
of underinsured motorist coverage possessed and the amount recovered from the
tortfeasor. Florida courts have reached the same conclusion. 8
3
Similarly, the language of the Ohio statute could be construed to require a
comparison of the effective, and not the stated, policy limits of the tortfeasor's
liability coverage, with the amount of the insured's underinsured motorist
coverage.8 4 Such a holding would increase the degree to which Ohio's underinsured
motorist statute attains the goal of underinsured motorist coverage, the provision of
an additional source of recovery to persons injured by another's wrongdoing.
A related issue not specifically addressed by Ohio's underinsured motorist stat-
ute is whether, for purposes of the comparison of the relative amounts of the tort-
feasor's liability coverage and the insured's underinsured motorist coverage, the
insured may "stack" the policy limits of more than one policy. 85 This would operate
to the benefit of the insured in a manner similar to the comparison of the effective,
rather than the stated, policy limits of the tortfeasor's liability coverage with the
amount of the insured's underinsured motorist coverage. Although at least two jur-
isdictions 86 allow stacking, generally it will not be possible in Ohio. The Ohio
underinsured 87 and uninsured 88 motorist statutes both allowed antistacking provisions
within the insurance contract. 89 Given that the tenor of the recent legislative action on
82. Id. at 1132.
83. Jones v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Rhode Island, 368 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1979). However, a more recent Florida
appellate case, Holt v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), added a twist to this
holding-when the multiple claimants are all claiming under the same underinsured policy there can be no recovery, even
though the effective limit of liability insurance was less than the amount of underinsured motorist coverage, since they
"obtained the same recovery which would have been available.., had the tortfeasor been insured to the same extent as
the insured." The dissent, however, stated that "this case cannot be distinguished from the case of Jones v. Travelers
Indem. Co. of Rhode Island . I..- Id. at 1060 (Anstead, J., dissenting). The Holt rationale would have precluded
recovery in Jones because in Jones both the insured and the tortfeasor had per person limits of fifteen thousand dollars.
Thus, "the tortfeasor [was] ... insured to the same extent as the insured." Id. at 1060. Holt, therefore, does not
withstand scrutiny. Nonetheless, the petition for review to the Supreme Court of Florida was denied. Holt v. State Auto
Mut. Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1981).
84. Hentemann, in his recent article, notes that some policies may specifically provide that underinsured motorist
coverage is triggered when the effective limits of the tortfeasor's liability coverage are less than the limits of the injured
insured's underinsured motorist coverage:
An underinsured motor vehicle is defined in the standard policy to mean a vehicle.., insured ... for
liability according to the law, but the limits of which: "(a) Are less than the limits you carry for uninsured motor
vehicle coverage under this policy; or (b) have been reduced by payments to persons other than an insured to an
amount less than the limits you carry for uninsured motor vehicle coverage under the policy."
Hentemann, Underinsured Motorist Coverage: A New Coverage With New Problems, 56 Onto ST. B. Ass'N. REP. 122,
124 (1983) (citing State Farm Mutual Car Policy, Endorsement 6275 R.R.).
85. See generally 1 I. ScimsRER, supra note 2, at § 35.02.
86. See St. Arnaud v. Allstate Ins. Co., 501 F. Supp. 192 (S.D. Miss. 1980); Cox v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
378 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). However, the Florida rule allowing stacking is riddled with exceptions. See,
e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sarle, 379 So. 2d 131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Yaden v. Hanover Ins. Co., 375 So. 2d
5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
87. Onto Rev. CODE ANN. § 3937.181(E) (Page Supp. 1980).
88. Id. § 3937.18(E) (Page Supp. 1980).
89. The original version of the Ohio uninsured motorist statute did not preclude stacking. It was not until 1980 that it
was so amended. See infra note 120.
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underinsured coverage in Ohio was to further protect the insurer, and not the insured,
it is not surprising that the antistacking provisions were not changed by the Ohio
General Assembly. 90 Thus, even if the potential for stacking exists, undoubtedly in
practice insureds will normally be denied this benefit.
In sum, the net result of the recent action of the Ohio General Assembly is a
redefinition of the term "underinsured motorist." A tortfeasor is now deemed un-
derinsured when the policy limits (or perhaps, the effective limits) of the tortfeasor's
liability coverage are lower than the policy limits of the injured insured's un-
derinsured motorist coverage. Once it is established that this fortuitous relationship
exists between the relative amounts of these policies, the injured insured may draw
upon his or her underinsured coverage only to the extent to which that coverage
exceeds the tortfeasor's liability coverage.
4. Denial of Underinsured Coverage to Insureds Purchasing the Minimum Amount
of Liability Insurance Required by Law
Aside from depriving underinsured coverage of much of its efficacy and pur-
pose, Ohio's statutory scheme leads inescapably to two further anomalies. The first
stems from the fact that in Ohio the minimum amount of liability insurance that may
be purchased is twelve thousand five hundred dollars per person and twenty-five
thousand dollars per occurrence. 9 1 The uninsured-underinsured motorist statute, as
revised by the Ohio General Assembly in 1982, requires that a policy's "un-
derinsured motorist coverage . . . shall be an amount of coverage equivalent to the
automobile liability ... coverage . "..."92 Thus, insureds who purchase the mini-
mum amount of liability coverage may only purchase uninsured and underinsured
coverage equivalent to that amount. Consequently, if the injured insured has only
purchased the minimum statutory amount of liability coverage, no tortfeasor could
ever93 be deemed underinsured, since the amount of the injured insured's un-
derinsured motorist coverage could never exceed the amount of the tortfeasor's liabil-
ity coverage, which must be in an amount at least equal to the minimum statutory
amount. Thus, insureds purchasing the minimum amount of liability insurance are
currently unable to purchase meaningful underinsured motorist coverage.
A similar observation disturbed the Minnesota Supreme Court when it consid-
ered the definition of an underinsured motorist. In Lick v. Dairyland Insurance Co.94
90. OHIo Rev. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(G) (Page Supp. 1982).
91. Offo REv. CODE ANN. § 4509.20 (Page Supp. 1982).
92. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1982). But see infra text accompanying note 10S.
93. If the tortfeasor has liability insurance, it must be at least equal to the minimum statutory amount; if he has none,
or less than the statutory minimum, then he is "uninsured," not "underinsured." Thus, if the victim has chosen the
minimum coverage, then the underinsured motorist coverage will never be triggered since no tortfeasor will ever be
underinsured compared to that injured insured. This conclusion assumes that the amount of liability insurance to be
compared with the insured's underinsured coverage is the stated, not the effective, limit of liability coverage. However,
even if the effective limits of coverage are used in the comparison, minimum underinsured liability coverage will still tend
to prove worthless, since in most cases there is only a single claimant for the tortfeasor's liability coverage and it is only
when there are multiple claimants that the effective limits and the policy limits of the tortfeasor's liability coverage will
differ.
94. 258 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. 1977). See also supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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the court held that under the then extant state statute, 95 underinsured motorist cover-
age was triggered only when the tortfeasor had a smaller amount of liability coverage
than did the injured insured. The court recognized that its holding would preclude
insureds with the minimum amount of liability coverage from purchasing effective
underinsured motorist coverage, but relied on the knowledge that the defendant
insurance company had advised the commissioner of insurance that no premium
would be charged for underinsured motorist coverage when purchased in an amount
equal to the minimum amount of liability coverage required in that state.96 It is not
known whether similar action will be taken by insurance companies in Ohio,
although the revised statute specifically allows insurers to sell underinsured motorist
coverage in an amount equal to the statutory minimum amount of liability coverage. 97
Nevertheless, it is certain that in Ohio, insureds currently purchasing the minimum
amount of liability insurance are precluded from purchasing effective underinsured
motorist coverage.
5. The Recent Action of the Ohio General Assembly
Mandates Inherently Deceptive Insurance Contracts
A second anomaly that arises from the redefinition of the term "underinsured
motorist" in Ohio is that the actual amount of underinsured coverage purchased by an
insured will nearly always be less than the amount stated in the policy. This is
because any amounts recovered from the tortfeasor must be deducted from the policy
limits. 98 Only rarely will an insured be able to collect the full amount of the policy
limits, since he or she normally will have recovered something from the tortfeasor. 99
If the insured has recovered nothing, then the tortfeasor is uninsured, and not un-
derinsured. Therefore, prospective insureds will be purchasing a specified amount of
coverage which in fact is always worth less than that amount. In fact, in many cases,
depending upon the relative amounts of the underinsured motorist and liability cover-
ages involved, the underinsured coverage will provide no compensation to the in-
sured, even though he or she has uncompensated damages. 100
95. Minnesota has since abandoned the definition of the term "underinsured motorist" that focuses on the
fortuitous relationship between the amount of the tortfeasor's liability insurance and the amount of the insured's un-
derinsured motorist coverage. At present, Minnesota requires only that there be uncompensated damages. See supra text
accompanying notes 67-72.
96. Lick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 791, 794 n.3 (Minn. 1977). The court stated:
It is true that the [underinsured] coverage [when in an amount equal to the minimum amount of liability
coverage] would never be applicable in an accident with an insured Minnesota motorist, but only where
decedents have been injured by a tortfeasor from a jurisdiction with lower minimums .... [T]he record
includes a letter sent by defendant to the commissioner of insurance soon after Minn. St. 1971, § 65B.26(d),
was enacted. In the letter defendant advised the commissioner that defendant would charge no premium for the
newly required supplemental [underinsured] coverage.
Id.
97. See infra note 108.
98. See Ono REv. CoDE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page Supp. 1982).
99. In a rare case the entire amount of an underinsured tortfeasor's liability coverage may be depleted by other
claimants. Because the tortfeasor had liability insurance, he is underinsured and not uninsured. In such a case, assuming
that the insured's underinsured motorist coverage is triggered, the insured may be able to recover the full policy limits of
his underinsured coverage since he or she recovered nothing from the underinsured tortfeasor.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
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IV. A POTENTIAL, ALBEIT IMPERFECT, RATIONALE FOR OHIO'S
REVISED STATUTE
This Comment has examined the efficacy of Ohio's recent redefinition of un-
derinsured motorist coverage in furthering the goals of such coverage, namely, to aid
the innocent victims of negligent drivers who possess insufficient liability coverage to
fully indemnify the victim for his or her damages. 1 l It has been demonstrated that
because the newly adopted Ohio version of underinsured motorist coverage requires
more than the mere presence of uncompensated damages it does not adequately meet
this goal. ' 0 2 It may be, however, that the Ohio General Assembly has rejected this
goal (which it arguably embraced in its initial reaction to the problem of the un-
derinsured motorist) 10 3 and is pursuing instead a much more limited objective.
Other jurisdictions have noted that under some statutory schemes it may be
better for the injured insured to have been injured by an uninsured rather than an
insured motorist. The Florida Supreme Court observed:
Suppose that accident victims under a policy with $50,000 "uninsured vehicle coverage"
in the form prescribed by the statute suffered damages in that amount. If the tortfeasor was
uninsured, his victims would have full compensation. But if the tortfeasor carried, say
$10,000 of liability insurance, then the uninsured vehicle coverage would not apply.
Instead the tortfeasor's victims would have an insured recovery of only the $10,000
available from the tortfeasor's insurer, substantially less than their damages and their
apparent $50,000 worth of protection from the negligence and financial irresponsibility of
other motorists. Ironically, the accident victims would have been better off if the tort-
feasor had violated the financial responsibility law by not carrying insurance.
1°4
101. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 37-48, 54-56.
104. Williams v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 382 So. 2d 1216, 1218 (Fla. 1980). A Texas Supreme Court
case illustrates that this is a valid criticism of uninsured motorist coverage. In Kemp v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New
York, 512 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1974), the amount of the torifeasor's liability insurance and the amount of the injured
insured's uninsured motorist coverage were both ten thousand dollars. Id. at 689. However, because of the presence of
multiple claims, the injured insured recovered less than five thousand dollars from the tortfeasor and was unable to draw
on his uninsured coverage since the tortfeasor did have some insurance. Id. at 690. The court noted that "this result
creates the anomalous situation that these petitioners ... would have been financially better off had Smith [the tortfeasorl
had no insurance at all since each petitioner then could have recovered up to the $10,000 per person limit of his own
uninsured motorist coverage." Id. In a later case, a Texas court discussed this anomaly, noting that: "Following Kemp,
the legislature amended Article 5.06-1 to include 'underinsured,' in addition to 'uninsured,' motorist coverage," Amer-
ican Gen. Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Oestreich, 617 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). Therefore, in this later
case, although just as in Kemp the limits of the tortfeasor's liability coverage and the victim's coverage both equalled ten
thousand dollars, because the victim recovered only nine thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars from the tortfeasor, he
was able to collect another two hundred and fifty dollars from his underinsured motorist coverage. Id. This clearly
illustrates that the goal is to remedy the anomaly observed in uninsured coverage and not protect against underinsured
drivers since, in Oestreich, the injured insured had damages in excess of twenty thousand dollars, but was unable to draw
upon the entire ten thousand dollars of underinsured motorist coverage that he had purchased. Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court also believed that the goal of underinsured motorist protection was to avoid "the
problem, faced by numerous other jurisdictions, of having to define 'uninsured' motorist to include [more than
those] ... without any insurance." Lick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. 1977) (emphasis in
original). Therefore, in Minnesota, at that time, the goal of underinsured motorist protection was merely to preclude the
anomalous situation that frequently it was better to be injured by an uninsured rather than an insured motorist. Minnesota
has since adopted the goal of dealing with underinsured motorists rather than merely supplementing uninsured motorist
coverage, and thus now requires only uncompensated damages before underinsured motorist protection is triggered. See
supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
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Underinsured motorist coverage, then, may be a mere reaction to a perceived anom-
aly in uninsured motorist coverage, rather than an attempt to deal effectively with
underinsured motorists. Regardless of whether this limited goal is the intended one, it
is clear that this is the effect of underinsured motorist coverage defined in terms of the
relative amounts of the tortfeasor's liability coverage and the injured insured's un-
derinsured motorist coverage.
The conclusion that this is the goal in Ohio is supported by the fact that un-
derinsured motorist coverage in Ohio can now only be purchased in conjunction with
uninsured motorist coverage. 105 Thus, the former is merely meant to supplement the
latter; it is not designed to fully deal with motorists who are underinsured in relation
to the injured insured's damages. The incorporation of the two types of coverage into
a single statute is also indicative of the General Assembly's belief that these are not
separate types of coverage but rather constitute a single category of protection. The
net effect of this coverage is "to allow the insured the same recovery which would
have been available to him had the tort-feasor [sic] been insured to the same extent as
the insured himself." 106 This is clearly the goal behind the recent revision of the Ohio
underinsured motorist provision. 107 At the present time, not only can underinsured
motorist protection be purchased only in conjunction with uninsured motorist protec-
tion, but both coverages also must be offered in an amount equal to the amount of
liability coverage purchased, although the insured may elect to purchase a smaller
amount of coverage. 108 This allows insureds to protect themselves against the negli-
gence of others only to the same extent that they protect others against their own
negligence. 109 This scheme thus allows an insured to protect himself to a lesser extent
105. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A) (Page Supp. 1982).
106. Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Fla. 1978).
107. Hentemann also believes that the purpose of the revision of underinsured motorist coverage is to allow an
insured to protect herself only to the same extent that she protects others:
[T]he purpose clause in the new statute mandating an offering of underinsured motorist coverage seems to
indicate a legislative intent to guarantee compensation only up to the limits of the injured insured's own
uninsured motorist coverage limits, which would normally be the amount of liability protection the insurer
affords the public should the insured cause an injury.
Hentemann, Underinsured Motorist Coverage: A New Coverage With New Problems, 56 Otio ST. B. Ass'N. REP. 122,
129 (1983).
108. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page Supp. 1982). A recent writer noted that the "limits of this new
[underinsured] coverage must be equal to the uninsured motorist coverage limits which can be no less than the limits
required by the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act; no more than the policyholder's liability coverage limits; or, upon
request by the insured, anywhere in between." Hentemann, Underinsured Motorist Coverage: A New Coverage with New
Problems, 56 OHIO ST. B. Ass'N. REP. 122, 123 (1983) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
109. New York had adopted this policy rationale explicitly by providing that "uninsured motorists insurance shall
provide coverage . . . if the limits of liability under all . . . insurance policies of another vehicle liable for damages are in
a lesser amount than the . . . liability limits of coverage provided by [this] . . . policy." N.Y. INS. LAW § 167-2-9
(Consol. Supp. 1982-1983). This makes it clear that uninsured motorist protection is meant to ensure that insurance equal
to the amount of liability coverage purchased by the insured to protect others will be available to the insured when he or
she is injured by the negligence of another. See also supra note 107.
Other jurisdictions have sought to allow persons to guarantee that insurance be available only in an amount equal to
the minimum required by law, rather than in an amount equal to the amount of liability insurance purchased by the
insured: "[Uninsured and underinsured coverage is designed] to ensure that should he [the insured] be injured by one who
carries liability insurance in an amount less than the minimum required by the Safety Responsibility Act, he will
nonetheless have available to him that full minimum amount." Lick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 791, 793-94
(Minn. 1977). Therefore, Minnesota, at that time, allowed such coverage to be purchased only in an amount equal to the
minimum amount of liability insurance required. Minnesota has since rejected this approach and instead now requires only
uncompensated damages for underinsured motorist coverage to be available. See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
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than to which he protects others by choosing a smaller amount of coverage but not
to protect himself to a greater extent by purchasing a larger amount of underinsured
and uninsured coverage.
The Ohio statutory scheme generally places an insured in the same position
whether he or she is injured by an uninsured or an insured motorist,1 10 and thus
avoids the anomalous situation in which it can be better to have been injured by an
uninsured rather than an insured motorist. The anomaly did not exist under Ohio's
original version of underinsured motorist coverage, however, and, therefore, it
needed no remedy. Under the original version of underinsured motorist coverage an
insured was in a better position if injured by an insured rather than an uninsured
motorist. Assuming equal amounts of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage,
as required by the statute, if the insured was injured by a tortfeasor who possessed no
liability coverage, the maximum amount the injured insured could recover would be
the amount of his or her uninsured coverage. But, if the tortfeasor did possess liability
insurance, the insured could recover the full amount of his or her own underinsured
coverage in addition to the tortfeasor's liability coverage. For example, if the injured
insured had fifty thousand dollars of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage
and damages of one hundred thousand dollars, and the tortfeasor had no liability
insurance, then the maximum amount the injured insured could collect would be fifty
thousand dollars. If the tortfeasor had liability insurance, however, then the injured
insured could collect under his or her underinsured coverage in addition to the amount
recovered from the tortfeasor. Thus, an injured insured would have preferred to have
been injured by an insured rather than an uninsured motorist.
Assuming the availability of uninsured motorist coverage, then, a legislature
could choose to: (1) require no form of underinsured motorist coverage (although this
option would lead to the anomalous result that in certain situations it would be better
to be injured by an uninsured rather than an insured motorist); (2) require un-
derinsured motorist coverage that seeks only to remedy the anomaly observed in (1)
(the insured would be in the same position whether injured by an insured or an
uninsured motorist); or (3) require underinsured motorist coverage that focuses on
uncompensated damages (under this option it would be preferable to be injured by an
insured rather than an uninsured motorist). Thus, the form of underinsured coverage
adopted determines whether it will be less, equally, or more preferable to have been
injured by an insured as opposed to an uninsured driver. The relationship resulting
from the use of the third approach seems, for a number of reasons, more desirable
than the other two.
First, prior to the existence of underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage,
the victim of an insured driver was in a better position than the victim of an uninsured
driver. The emergence of underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage in the form
adopted by the Ohio revised statute has altered this relationship by reducing the
110. This is not always true, however. If the tortfeasor had liability insurance in excess of the injured insured's
uninsured motorist coverage, then it is obviously more advantageous to be injured by that insured tortfeasor.
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amount recoverable by the victim of an insured driver. This benefits no one (except
the insurer) and is not a desirable option.
Second, the victim of an insured driver has access to two sources of compensa-
tion, namely, the tortfeasor's liability insurance and his or her own underinsured
motorist coverage. In contrast, the victim of an uninsured driver has access to only
one source of compensation, her own uninsured motorist coverage. A victim of an
insured driver, because she has access to two sources of compensation, should there-
fore be able to recover a greater amount than the victim of an uninsured driver with
access to only one source of compensation.
Third, and most important, adoption of the form of underinsured motorist cover-
age that requires only uncompensated damages goes beyond mere supplementation of
uninsured motorist coverage, and moves toward the goal of full compensation for the
innocent victims of negligent drivers. It should not matter how much liability in-
surance the injured insured purchased to protect others-which is made the critical
factor under the revised statute-for the simple reason that the injured insured has not
injured anyone. The injured insured has sustained damages as the result of another's
tortious conduct, and the overriding goal in such a situation should be to indemnify,
as completely as possible, the innocent victim for his or her injuries, which, in many
cases, are severe, incapacitating, and permanent.
In sum, the recent action of the Ohio General Assembly can be rationalized,
when viewed in isolation, as an attempt to remedy an anomaly inherent in uninsured
motorist coverage. When viewed in context, however, its irrationality becomes ap-
parent. First, the anomaly referred to did not previously exist in Ohio. Second,
instead of adjusting the relationship between injury by an insured or by an uninsured
tortfeasor so that it is not worse to be injured by an insured as opposed to an uninsured
tortfeasor, the General Assembly has adjusted the relationship so that it is no better to
be injured by an insured as opposed to an uninsured tortfeasor. The General Assem-
bly has not remedied an anomaly; it has created one. Last, and most important,
underinsured motorist coverage under the revised Ohio Statute no longer effectively
deals with the problem of uncompensated damages that arise when the innocent
victims of negligent drivers are damaged beyond the ability of the tortfeasor's liabil-
ity coverage to provide indemnification.
V. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION
The most effective way to require insurance companies to offer underinsured
motorist coverage that protects against uncompensated damages would be for the
General Assembly to simply negate their recent action and reinstate the original
version of underinsured motorist coverage.
Unfortunately, it is not clear that this Comment and the criticisms contained
herein will generate legislative activity of this kind, since normally it is effective
lobbying, and not legal argument, that prompts legislative action.' It is also un-
I 11. One writer has observed:
The legislative process is not a rationale enterprise in the sense of a conclave of solons deciding issues of public
policy through pure ratiocination. A legislature is not selfconsciously rational like a court; it does not ground its
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likely that an effective lobbying effort could be launched to reinstate the original
version of the underinsured motorist statute. This is because, as the Honorable Abner
J. Mikva observed:
In the starkest terms, our system of interest representation favors the rich, the well-
educated and the well-organized, at the expense of the poor, the uneducated and the
unorganized.
The reasons for this bias are not hard to discover. Effective interest representation
requires organization. And organization, in turn, requires time, money and in-
formation.12
Mikva's observation is particularly appropriate in the instant context. Insurance
companies, who obviously benefited from the revision in the law, are wealthy,
intelligent and organized. The insureds, on the other hand, when viewed in relation to
the insurance industry, are poor, uneducated, and unorganized. Mikva recognized
that similar remarks could be made regarding any issue that pits consumer against
producer-the unorganized against the organized. 13 It may be unduly pessimistic,
however, to conclude that there is no possibility of legislative action to deal with the
problem of incompletely compensated victims of negligent drivers; examples of
legislative action taken to resolve similar inequities can be found."'
Furthermore, it is possible that insureds will be able to contract independently
for protection against uncompensated damages. It must be noted that the recent action
of the Ohio General Assembly does not prohibit such insurance; it simply does not
require it.1 15 As the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized, however, insurance poli-
cies cannot realistically be treated as contracts in the traditional sense. 116 Because of
decisions on logic and precedent. Its members are interested in more than just legal arguments. This might seem
obvious, but it is difficult for many lawyers to alter their approach when engaging in legislative activity. As an
example, during the 1976 New York State Constitutional Convention, the paid representative of one of the bar
associations, a lawyer, told this writer that the criticism he planned against a provision of the judiciary article of
the proposed constitution was a "devastating law review article." This is not the kind of approach that achieves
attention in the legislature.
Prendergast, A Professional Approach to Advocacy in a Legislature, 34 ALB. L. REv. 69, 69-70 (1969).
112. Mikva, Interest Representation in Congress: The Social Responsibilities of the Washington La,er, 38 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 651, 663 (1970).
113. "The disparity in interest representation under the present rules of the game is even clearer. . . in the case of
consumers." Id. at 665.
114. The Ohio General Assembly recently has taken at least two measures that expand the ability of tort victims to
seek adequate compensation. The Wrongful Death Act was recently amended to allow recovery of nonpecuniary as well as
pecuniary damages. Onlto REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(B) (Page Supp. 1982). Contributory negligence was recently
replaced by a statutory scheme of comparative negligence. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 2513.19 (Page 1981). Therefore, it
may be that tort victims do have a successful advocate in the Ohio General Assembly capable of spurring action to
ameliorate the present inequities in Ohio's approach to underinsured motorist coverage.
115. Hentemann, in his recent article, believes that some insurers will voluntarily offer protection against un-
compensated damages even though not required to do so by the statute:
In the Limits of Liability section of that underinsured motorist coverage, it is usually stated that the limits
of liability shall be: (1) the difference between the limits of the underinsured motorist coverage and the sum of
the limits of all liability policies applicable to the tortfeasor (citing State Farm Mutual Car Policy, Endorsement
6275 R.R.], or (2) the difference between the insured's damages and such liability limits available up to the
uninsured limits [citing Allstate Automobile Insurance Company Policy, Endorsement AU 11501.
Hentemann, Underinsured Motorist Coverage: A New Coverage With New Problems, 56 Onto ST. B. Ass'N. REP. 122,
128 (1983) (emphasis in original). This, of course, does not mean that insureds will be able to bargain successfully for
protection against uncompensated damages from insurers who do not wish to provide it voluntarily.
116. The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized this fact in the following comments on insurance contracts:
[lit is important to realize the nature of the parties involved .... [I]nsurance companies are in a much stronger
bargaining position vis-a-vis their customers when insurance is sold ....
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unequal bargaining power between the insured and his or her insurer, few insureds
will be able to bargain successfully for coverage in excess of that required by law.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that insureds have the power to bargain for
additional coverage, they generally would not be sufficiently informed to know what
type of coverage for which to bargain. As the Florida Supreme Court has noted:
"Few automobile owners [are] . . .aware of the difference between 'uninsured vehi-
cle coverage' and 'underinsured vehicle coverage,' and too many learn of the differ-
ence only in the context of an automobile accident.'
' 1 7
The only remaining possibility is recourse to the Ohio judiciary. The Ohio
Supreme Court has vividly and concretely evinced a desire to soften the harshness of
other actions of the Ohio General Assembly s18 and, in particular, to provide a source
of compensation to the victims of uninsured motorists.' 19 However, this was possible
in the uninsured motorist context only because of the court's finding that the various
contractual limitations on uninsured coverage were in conflict with the intent of the
uninsured motorist statute.' 20 This approach, of course, would not be effective with
Insurance companies write the policies and present the pre-printed forms to customers, most of whom are
unfamiliar with the terminology found in the multi-page policies. Most customers accept the policies in toto and
do not question, let alone actively negotiate to change or omit, any of the provisions in the pre-printed forms.
Ady v. West American Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 593, 597, 433 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1982).
117. Williams v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 382 So. 2d 1216, 1218 (Fla. 1980). See also supra note 116.
118. The resistance of the Ohio Supreme Court to legislative restrictions on the ability of tort victims to seek
compensation is vividly illustrated by its reaction to the one year statute of limitations recently imposed by the Ohio
General Assembly on medical malpractice claims. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (A) (Page 1981). See, e.g., Lombard
v. Good Samaritan Medical Center, 69 Ohio St. 2d 471, 433 N.E.2d 162 (1982) (one year statute of limitations for
medical malpractice claims contained in OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(A) (Page 1981), does not apply to claims for
negligence of hospital employees whose conduct does not fall within the common-law definition of malpractice); Koler v.
Saint Joseph Hosp., 69 Ohio St. 2d 477, 432 N.E.2d 821 (1982) (action for wrongful death arising out of medical
malpractice governed by two year statute of limitations contained in Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 Page Supp. 1981),
rather than the one year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims); Whitt v. Columbus Coop. Enter., 64 Ohio
St. 2d 355, 415 N.E.2d 985 (1980) (action for loss of consortium, services and medical expenses, arising from medical
malpractice on wife, governed by the four year statute of limitations contained in Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.09(D)
(Page 1981), rather than the one year statute of limitation for medical malpractice claims); Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32
Ohio St. 2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972) (when foreign object left inside patient's body, statute of limitations tolled until
patient discovers or should have discovered the medical malpractice); Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164,267 N.E.2d 419
(1971) (cause of action for medical malpractice accrues when patient-client relationship terminated, rather than when the
malpractice occurred). In each of these cases the court attempted to mitigate the harshness of the short one year statute of
limitations for medical malpractice claims imposed by the Ohio General Assembly.
The Ohio Supreme Court's efforts extend beyond resisting legislatively imposed restrictions upon the ability of
innocent victims to seek compensation for their damages. The court has also made inroads on common-law restrictions. In
Prem v. Cox, 2 Ohio St. 3d 149, 443 N.E.2d 511 (1983), the court held that a surviving spouse may not assert the
common-law inter-spousal immunity as a defense in an action by the estate of the deceased spouse for wrongful death
occasioned by the negligence of the surviving spouse. Similarly, in Haverlack v. Portage Homes, 2 Ohio St. 3d 26, 442
N.E.2d 749 (1982), the court held that municipalities no longer possess common-law immunity against claims for
negligence.
119. See supra note 54. To date, the Ohio Supreme Court has not had occasion to address the underinsured motorist
provision, either in its original or revised form.,
120. See supra note 54. However, the Ohio General Assembly, in accord with its history of protecting insurance
companies, has, in effect, overruled the keystone decision in the uninsured motorist context, thereby depriving many of
the other cases of their utility. In Curran v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Ohio St. 2d 33, 266 N.E.2d 566 (1971), the
court held that "other insurance" exclusionary clauses were invalid, which meant that insureds were able to "stack" the
uninsured motorist coverage of several policies to provide a greater amount of coverage. Most other decisions of the court
simply treated a person as an "insured" under more than one policy, which permitted the insured to stack the coverages of
those policies. Curran held that a contract of insurance cannot preclude stacking on the ground that this would violate the
intent of the uninsured motorist statute. Id. at 38, 266 N.E.2d 566 at 569. The Ohio General Assembly, however,
amended the uninsured motorist statute to provide, effective June 25, 1980, that any "policy of insurance that includes
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regard to underinsured coverage since the statute itself allows the limitation on
coverage. Therefore, for the Ohio judiciary to hold that underinsured motorist cover-
age is triggered by the mere existence of uncompensated damages, it must do so on
the basis of statutory construction.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in Prem v. Cox, 121 has recently reiterated the princi-
ple of statutory construction that:
[T]he General Assembly will not be presumed to have intended to enact a law producing
unreasonable or absurd consequences. It is the duty of the courts, if the language of a
statute fairly permits or unless restrained by the clear language thereof, so to construe the
statute as to avoid such a result.' 22
In Prem the court found it necessary to ignore certain language within the Ohio
Wrongful Death Act 123 in order to implement the goal "fundamental to our [Ohio's]
legal system that one may seek redress for a substantial wrong."1 24 The Wrongful
Death Act allows recovery "[w]hen death of a person is caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default which would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action
and recover damages if death had not ensued.' ' 125 In Prem the court was confronted
with a claim by the estate of a deceased spouse against the surviving spouse for
wrongful death allegedly resulting from the negligence of the surviving spouse.
Although the Wrongful Death Act is explicitly inapplicable unless the deceased party
would have been able to recover damages had death not ensued, the court refused to
abide by this stricture. The court recognized 126 that the deceased spouse in Prem
could not have recovered damages had death not ensued (due to the existence of the
common law inter-spousal immunity), but allowed recovery under the statute on the
ground that otherwise the Wrongful Death Act would give rise to unreasonable or
absurd results. 127
Similarly, the Ohio courts could, if necessary, override language in the revised
version of the underinsured motorist statute. The revised provision provides for:
Underinsured motorist coverage, which shall be in an amount of coverage equivalent to
the automobile liability or motor vehicle liability coverage and shall provide protection
for an insured against loss from bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death,
where the limits of coverage available for payment to the insured under all ... insurance
policies covering persons liable to the insured are less than the limits for the insured's
uninsured motorist coverage may include terms and conditions that preclude stacking of uninsured vehicle coverages."
OIto REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(G) (Page Supp. 1981). This action not only overrules Curran but robs the other cases of
their utility since, if the insured cannot stack the coverages of multiple policies, it is useless to be an insured under more
than one policy.
121. 2 Ohio St. 3d 149, 443 N.E.2d 511 (1983).
122. Id. at 152, 443 N.E.2d at 514.
123. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page Supp. 1982).
124. Prem v. Cox, 2 Ohio St. 3d 149, 151-52, 443 N.E.2d 511, 514 (1983).
125. Omto REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page Supp. 1982).
126. "[I]nterspousal immunity [could have been] ... asserted in the case subjudice to protect the husband from
liability in a suit by his injured wife [had she survived] .... " Prem v. Cox, 2 Ohio St. 3d 149, 151,443 N.E.2d 511,
514 (1983) (citing Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 431 N.E.2d 998 (1982)).
127. Prem v. Cox, 2 Ohio St. 3d 149, 152,443 N.E.2d 511, 514 (1983) (citing Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes.
16 Ohio St. 2d 47, 242 N.E.2d 566 (1968). See also supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
[Vol. 44:771
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE IN OHIO
uninsured motorist coverage at the time of the accident. The limits of liability for an
insurer providing underinsured motorist coverage shall be the limits of such coverage, less
those amounts actually recovered .... 128
If the court can be convinced to focus on the goal expressed in the italicized portion of
the statutory language, it may be further convinced to deem the language following
the italicized language inconsistent with that goal, thereby further protecting the
insured against loss. In other words, the court would be asked to conclude that to give
effect to the subsequent language would produce an unreasonable and absurd result,
since that language significantly lessens the degree to which the goal of protecting
insureds against loss will be attained. It might be countered, of course, that the clear
language of the statute precludes such a conclusion. In Prem, however, the restrictive
language was also clear, but the court, to achieve the fundamental goal of providing
compensation to the victims of another's tortious conduct, refused to give effect to
the language.
Admittedly, this argument is a slim reed upon which to anchor any hope of
ameliorating the harshness of the recent action of the Ohio General Assembly. But,
given the improbability that any relief will be forthcoming from the General
Assembly 129 and that insureds will be able to bargain successfully for more extensive
coverage,130 any amelioration of the harsh effect of the General Assembly's recent
action must be the result of such judicial construction of Ohio's revised version of
underinsured motorist coverage.
Michael S. Miller
128. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
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